The uses of Homer in Plato's Philebus by Torres, Bernat
ANUARI DE FILOLOGIA. ANTIQVA ET MEDIAEVALIA (Anu.Filol.Antiq.Mediaeualia) 
6/2016, pp. 55-77, ISSN: 2014-1386 
Data de recepció: 19/III/2016 
Data d’acceptació: 25/VI/2016 
 
THE USES OF HOMER IN PLATO’S PHILEBUS 
 
BERNAT TORRES 





The paper presents a study on the presence of Homer in Plato’s Philebus. After a brief 
summary of the dialogue and after indicating a couple of implicit references to Homer to be 
found in the Platonic text (like the figure of Aphrodite and the image of the journey of Ulysses), 
the work focuses on analysing the two single explicit appearances of Homer in Plato’s Philebus. 
The first one in Philebus 47e, corresponding to the 18th book of the Iliad (108-109); the second 
one in Philebus 62d corresponding to the fourth book of the Iliad (450-456). The paper analyses 
these references in detail, examining Platoʹs use of the Homeric poems and analysing their 
significance, often hidden, in the dialogue as a whole. The analysis also shows the importance 
of the equivalences between Homer and Plato, that is, the similar or dissimilar treatment that 
they make of some important issues, like the description of human emotions, the confrontation 
between gods and men or the search for truth. 
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L’escrit presenta un estudi de la presència d’Homer en el Fileb de Plató. Després d’un breu 
resum del diàleg i d’indicar un parell de referències implícites a Homer que es troben en el text 
platònic (com la figura d’Afrodita i la imatge del viatge d’Ulisses), el treball se centra en 
analitzar les dues aparicions explícites d’Homer en el diàleg, les quals remeten a la Ilíada. La 
primera es troba a Fileb 47e i ens remet al llibre 18 de la Ilíada (108-109); la segona es troba a 
Fileb 62d i ens remet al llibre 4 de la Ilíada (450-456).  El treball analitza aquestes referències de 
forma detallada, observant l’ús que fa Plató dels poemes homèrics i analitzant la significació, 
sovint oculta, que una lectura atenta de les referències aporta a la comprensió del text platònic i 
també al joc d’equivalències entre ambdós autors antics, és a dir, als llocs comuns entre la 
manera de tractar certs problemes, com la relació entre homes i déus, les emocions o la recerca 
de la veritat.  
 
PARAULES CLAU: Plató, Homer, Sòcrates, Fileb, Odissea, Ilíada 
 
In Plato’s Philebus, Socrates is presenting to the reader a reflection about the best 
possible life; the dialogue, in its description of human nature, delves into the 
manifold of experiences of pleasure and pain and elevates toward the 
contemplation of reason as the source of order both in human life and in the 
cosmos. As human beings we are in the in-between, in the μεταξύ, we live 
between a desired and never reached fulfillment and an immediate experience 
of emptiness and lack; we are always impelled to decide, as Socrates makes 
perfectly clear in the conclusive page of the dialogue, between the authority of 
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the beast and that of the philosophical muse that dwells in us (Philebus, 67b1-6). 
In the long journey of his research, Socrates will try to find, like a new 
Odysseus, his way back home, the dwelling place of the best life and the good, 
but despite all the efforts, he will not be able to reach his goal. At the same time, 
he will need to confront his arguments with two worshippers of the goddess 
Aphrodite, Philebus and Protarchus, who believe that pleasure is the best thing 
and will fight for its victory in the battlefield of the dialogue. In the construction 
of the conversation, Plato will remind us of the relevance of the Homeric 
imagery to describe, not the beautiful images of the hoped-for good and the 
best possible life (elements that are important parts of the argument), but the 
anger of the godly warrior Achilles avenging his friend Patroclus or the bloody 
war between the Greeks and the Trojans, a war originated and secretly 
organized by the gods. The Platonic’ uses of Homer in the Philebus recall the 
violent and complex character of some aspects of human nature and recall the 
difficulties for the establishment of a friendly dialogue about important 
questions.  
In most of the commentaries and academic presentations of the Platonic 
dialogues the Homeric imagery present in them is noticed, but often left 
unattended or unexplained.1 Our intention in the following lines will be to 
show that a careful examination of these images can enrich both the general 
interpretation of the Platonic text itself and shed at the same time some light on 
the sequence of events and experiences that both Homer and Plato shared.2 
After a brief summary of the dialogue we will in the first section comment on a 
couple of general equivalences between the  Homeric world and Plato’s Philebus 
                                                          
1 We can give testimony of this fact concerning the commentaries of Plato’s Philebus, the 
dialogue to which we devoted our PhD, where both the implicit and explicit references to 
Homer are often left unexplained and unexplored. So what we present here is as well a 
contribution to the understanding of Plato’s Philebus. The most extensive work devoted to the 
presence of Homer in Plato’s dialogue is the one of Labarbe (1987), the limitation of his work 
being that it offers only the references and a short philological explanation. There are in Plato 
around 150 direct references to the work of Homer, in Plato Philebus we find, as we have said, 
two of them. 
2 In this second sense, the exercise that we are presenting here can be understood as a search 
for equivalences of experience and symbolization between Plato and Homer and. As the work 
of Z. Planinc shows, the field of study that examines Plato’s use and understanding of his 
tradition is familiar to the academics but “relatively unexplored”; Planinc considers that 
“thereʹs a wealth of equivalent symbolizations of equivalent experiences in Greek literature 
before Plato; I assume that Platoʹs awareness and understanding of the phenomenon is broadly 
comparable to Voegelin’s; Iʹm certain that Plato wrote the dialogues to reflect his understanding 
of this tradition; and I am also certain that the several versions of what I have been calling 
"reading the dialogues Biblically" are blind to it. The field of study is wide and rich and, despite 
the familiarity of the texts, relatively unexplored. The only obstacles preventing discovery of its 
treasures are the self-imposed limitations that can be overcome by following Nietzscheʹs simple 
rule: Do not read with the theologiansʹ instinct” (Planinc 2007). See also Planinc (2008; 2004; 
2003) and for the reference to Eric Voegelin see Voegelin (2000). 
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and, after that, in the second and third sections, we will explore the two explicit 
references to Homer that Plato made in the dialogue: one in 47e (Iliad, 18, 108-
109) and the other in 62d (Iliad, 4, 450-56).  
Platoʹs Philebus deals with the question of the happiest life, his main 
objective being to search for a “state or disposition of the soul that can render 
life happy for all human beings” (Philebus, 11d3-4).3 During his research, 
Socrates will be accompanied by the young and inexperienced Protarchus and 
his silent friend Philebus (‘the lover of youth’); two apparently fictitious 
characters that represent a more or less extreme form of hedonism present in 
the city of Athens.4 Both seem to worship the goddess Aphrodite (Philebus, 
12a4-c7) and this fact is connected with the idea that pleasure is identical with 
good and that the best possible life is a life of unlimited pleasure. In the long 
journey of the conversation, Socrates will need to prove that all these equations 
are false: that pleasure and Aphrodite must be conceptually detached and, 
moreover, that pleasure is not identical with the good although being part of 
the best possible life. Socrates will be mainly talking with Protarchus, who is 
willing to listen to him more that Philebus, who peacefully rests without being 
disturbed (Philebus, 15c9).  
Both Philebus and Protarchus defend the view that for any living creature 
the best way of life is a life of pleasure (ἡδονή) and joy, whereas Socrates at the 
beginning of the dialogue defends the view that for any human being “to be 
thoughtful, to think, to remember, and, what’s akin to them, right opinion and 
true calculation, prove to be better and preferable to pleasure” (Philebus, 11b6-
8).5 The confrontation between this two λόγοι proves from the beginning of the 
dialogue to be ineffective and that is why Socrates introduces a third possibility, 
                                                          
3 “ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν ἀποφαίνειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι 
τὸν βίον εὐδαίμονα παρέχειν”. We are using throughout the paper the Seth Benardete 
translation (Benardete 1993). For the Greek source we are using Burnet (1903), an edition 
available in the Perseus Digital Library.  
4 Philebus (Φίληβος) is defined above all by his name, which means “the lover of youth” (cf. 
16b, 46b, 53d), which probably has to do with the pleasures deriving from the life of the young 
and their beauty; he is the original defender of a life of pure pleasure which will be transmitted 
to Protarchus. It has been suggested that Philebus may represent Eudoxus in this dialogue 
(Robin 1950) (Gosling 1975). See also Schofield (1971), Bringmann (1972) and Tarrant (2008) for 
the discussion around the enemies of Philebus (cf. 44b-51a) and the more or less clear reference 
that the dialogue makes to Speusitppe or Eudoxus. Protarchus (Πρώταρχος) means the “first 
principle” or the “first beginning”; we know that he is the son of Callias (cf. 19b, 36d); he calls 
himself a disciple of Gorgias (cf. 57e), and he is a follower of Philebus and probably younger 
than him (cf. 16b3). Socrates is older than Philebus and Protarchus, and manifests a strange 
combination between the will to guide the reflection of the young Protarchus and that of 
returning home. Socrates (Σωκράτης) means “serious government”, or “serene mastery”; it is 
he who initially proposes the life of reflection as the best possible life, and he also describes the 
greatest pleasure as pleasure pure of pain (cf. 51a-52c). 
5 “τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ συγγενῆ, δόξαν τε ὀρθὴν καὶ 
ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, τῆς γε ἡδονῆς ἀμείνω”. 
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a third λóγος that defends the view that the best possible life is a measured 
mixture of pleasure and reason (Philebus, 22a-b; cf. 27d1-2).6 The fact that both 
Socrates and Protarchus share the possibility of this third option, a possibility 
built up thanks to different agreements (ὁμολογεῖν),7 will render the dialogue 
possible and effective because it will in fact allow discussion not focused on the 
victory of any of the opponents (that would be an eristic discussion), but on the 
search for the most true of the λόγοι defended: “we are not –states Socrates- 
contending here out of love of victory [φιλονικία] for my suggestion to win or 
for yours. We ought to act together as allies [συμμαχεῖν] in support of the 
truest one” (Philebus, 14b3-6). The possible alliance (συμμαχεῖν) between two 
initially confronted positions represents the searching for truth as a shared goal 
that tends to eliminate confrontations and enmities and allows a proper 
dialectical approach to the questions treated; an approach that is opposed to 
eristic, understood as love of victory (φιλονικια, 17a1-5).8 In this sense, Socrates 
will insist that he is not one of Philebus’ enemies or an enemy of hedonism, but 
a good friend of those who search for the truth in proper dialogue. 
The construction of this third possibility, sustained on the common 
ground of a more or less stable alliance between Socrates and Protarchus, can 
very well explain the structure of the argumentative sequence of the dialogue as 
a whole. A sequence that can be divided into six sections and that will help us 
in locating the Homeric imagery in the dialogue as a whole. Firstly, a section 
where the dialectical method is presented as a way to deal with unities or 
concepts like reason, pleasure or the mixture of them (Philebus, 12c-20c). 
Secondly, a section where the notion of Good is examined as the model for the 
best human life understood as a mixture of pleasure and reason, defeating in 
this sense the two initial candidates, reason and pleasure (Philebus, 20b-23b). 
The third section, in a new attempt to make the dialogue possible between 
Socrates and Protarchus, moves to a description of the structure of cosmic 
reality, showing how this structure is bound to the structure of human life and 
the elements that constitute it (pleasure, reason and the mixture of the two); in 
this section cosmic reality is described as constituted by four elements: the 
unlimited (represented in our life by pleasure),9 the limit or the limitation, the 
                                                          
6 See the final production of the mixture at 61b-64b. 
7 The presence of agreements is an essential element to understand a platonic dialogue. See 
Philebus 11c9; 11d-12a5; 14c and ff.; 20c and ff. 
8 Observe, for example, Socratesʹ response to the exigencies of Philebus: “Nor is your reason 
the good, Socrates, and the same complaint applies to us”, where Socrates replies: “It may apply 
to my reason, Philebus, but certainly not to the true, the divine reason, I should think” (Philebus, 
22c2-5). The true and divine reason, difficult as it may be to reach it, seems to be a good basis for 
a friendly conversation. 
9 It is important to note that although pleasure in itself is part of the category of the unlimited, 
this element can be also seen, from the point of view of its origin, as part of the genus of the 
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mixture between them (represented in our life by the best possible mixture of 
pleasure and reason) and, finally, the cause of this mixture (represented in our 
life by reason as a source of order and limitation) (Philebus, 23c-31a). After that, 
Socrates initiates in the fourth section, the longest of the dialogue, a very 
extensive and complete analysis of the nature of pleasure, showing its origin in 
the human body and the different forms it takes to find at the end the most pure 
forms of pleasure (Philebus, 31b-55c). Then, we find a short section examining 
the nature of reason, its different kinds and determining as well the most pure 
or exact forms of science (Philebus, 55c-59c). After that, in the last section of the 
dialogue, Socrates will go on to produces in the speech the best possible 
mixture, taking the most pure elements of pleasure and most of the elements of 
reason to create a beautiful, measured and true mixture, a mixture that should 
represent the best possible human life (Philebus, 59d-66d). As we will see, the 
explicit quotes of Homer are both to be found at the end of the dialogue, the 
first one in the fourth section devoted to analyze the nature of pleasure; and the 
second one in the section where the mixture of pleasure and reason is produced 
in the speech. However, before analyzing them, let us comment on more 
general and implicit equivalences between Plato and Homer: the first one 
concerning the general subject of the dialogue, that is, the choice for a certain 
way of life represented by the divinity Aphrodite; the second one concerning 




APHRODITE’S CHOICE AND THE WAY BACK HOME OF THE HERO 
 
At the beginning of the dialogue, Philebus acknowledges that he is a follower 
and a worshiper of a divinity that seems to be Aphrodite, the goddess of love, 
pleasure and procreation.10 He recalls this divinity to witness his withdrawal 
from the conversation: “As a matter of fact, I wash my hands of it entirely and 
call to witness now the goddess herself” (Philebus, 12b1-2). This divinity -as we 
stated before- will be identified by Philebus and Protarchus with pleasure and 
with the good itself (Philebus, 13b8-c3); an identification that Socrates will need 
to prove to be false. His prove will begin with a clear expression of his respect 
in front of the names of the gods:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
mixture or the common in so far as pleasure always arises together or combined with pain 
(Philebus, 31c2-4). 
10 See Hesiod, Theogony 176 ff; Works and Days 60 ff; 520 ff. For the presence of Aphrodite in 
Homer see Iliad 5. 429 ff; 5. 349 ff; 5. 422 ff; 3. 389 ff; 14. 187 ff. As it is well-know, in the Platonic 
dialogues a distinction is made between two different kinds of eros and two Aphrodites; one of 
them is ʹpopularʹ, the other, ourania, carries all the aristocratic overtones; only the latter one is to 
be defended and praised by Pausanias in his speech in Plato’s Symposium (180d4-5). 
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[my dread] in the face of the names of the gods –says Socrates- is never on a human level 
but lies beyond the greatest fear. So now in the case of Aphrodite, in whatever way it’s 
dear to her, that’s the way I address her; but as for pleasure I know it’s a complex thing, 
and in beginning from it, just as I said, we must examine and reflect on what nature it has 
(Philebus, 12c1-5).  
 
Socratesʹ intention before Philebus and Protarchus at the very beginning of 
the dialogue will be to deprive pleasure of its godly aura (of its identification 
with Aphrodite) in order to examine it as a unity that arises primarily as a 
human experience. In this sense, one of the main objectives of Socrates in the 
first part of the dialogue will be the de-mythologizing or de-divinizing of 
pleasure. That does not mean at all that in his research pleasure cannot be 
shown as an element connected with some transcendent order; in fact, at the 
end of his analysis, pleasure will be identified with ἀπείρων, a formless and 
always changing reality, essential element of the cosmic order (cf. Philebus, 
31a6-9; 53c ff.).11 As it often happens, the Platonic examination connects –in the 
dramatic scene of the dialogue- the human with the divine and the cosmic in 
order to reach a proper comprehension of the questions treated. Socratesʹ 
examination of pleasure will be followed and in some sense shared by 
Protarchus, but Philebus will rest in peace and remain almost silent all the time. 
He will remain all along the dialogue a pious follower of Aphrodite: for him 
pleasure must be identified with this divinity and also with the good and with 
the unlimited; “for unless it were in fact by nature unlimited in point and 
manifold and the more, pleasure would not otherwise be totally good” 
(Philebus, 27e7-10). Philebus has made a choice, a choice for a life of pleasure 
understood as a simple and plain experience (as a more without a less, as joy 
without pain),12 a life in the unlimited under the auspices of Aphrodite. The 
very possibility of the dialogue is built upon the fact that Protarchus has not yet 
made his definitive choice. 
The relevance of this fact and the presence of the divinity in it is what 
allow us to trace an important indirect equivalence between Homer and Plato. 
This is so because the divinity of Aphrodite is presented both in the dialogue 
and the Homeric poem (and of course in other sources of the Greek tradition) as 
the origin of a confrontation, a confrontation that has to do in both cases with a 
choice. As M. Dixsaut points out, this choice in the dialogue may be a reminder 
of the choice or the judgment of Paris, a choice that favored Aphrodite in front 
                                                          
11 Pleasure understood as ἀπείρων offers to the reader a new example to understand the in-
between character of our existence, because ἀπείρων is both an element of the cosmic reality 
and of the human soul. In locating pleasure in its right place in reality, Socrates makes 
superfluous and irrelevant the identification between pleasure and the divinity Aphrodite.  
12 As the dialogue will show, Philebusʹ understanding of the unlimited character of pleasure is 
wrong in the sense that it does not take into account the connection between pleasure and pain, 
that is, the mixed nature of pleasure. In doing this, Philebus shows his ignorance concerning his 
own self-representation and image. 
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of Hera and Athena and that in the Homeric tale brought the Athenians to the 
dreadful war against Troy (Iliad, 24, 25–30).13 Indeed, also in the dialogue 
Aphrodite represents the origin of the conflict between the interlocutors. All 
along his journey, Socrates will need to persuade and in some sense convert 
Protarchus in order to show him that the best life is not the one that Philebus 
has chosen, devoted to the unlimited pleasures of Aphrodite, but a life devoted 
to a moderate joyful existence that acknowledges its unlimited character in the 
right way.14  
Another equivalence can be found concerning the image of the journey 
that the dialogue describes and, what is more important, the inability or 
impossibility of Socrates to return home. When Socrates explains the 
methodology that he and Protarchus are going to follow in order to reach the 
fixed goal (i.e. the production in the speech of the best possible mixture 
between pleasure and reason of which the happiest life consists), he talks about 
the «the finer way» (καλλίων ὁδὸς; cf. Philebus, 16b6), the so called dialectical 
method. This method or way, in a similar sense as it happens in other dialogues 
like the Republic, is more than an analytical method of dividing and classifying; 
it is a way or a journey in which different difficulties and dangers are 
presented. There is no way, no possible method, without the difficulties that 
accompany it, that means that there is no method without perplexity:  
 
there is not –states Socrates- nor would there ever be, a more beautiful way than the one 
of which I am always a lover, although it has often before now escaped me and left me 
deserted, pathless, and perplexed [ἄπορος] (Philebus, 16b6-9). 
 
In fact, the different perplexities can very well explain the sequence of the 
dialogue. Moreover, to complete this image and to connect it with the Homeric 
journey of Odysseus, the dialogue shows a Socrates that is all through his 
journey willing to go back home15 and that, at the end, he will be unable to 
reach his goal. In this case not because of a prophecy, but because Plato wanted 
to remind us of the unlimited nature of pleasure, the unlimited nature of 
Protarchusʹ desire for discourses and, in a broader sense, the impossibility of 
reaching the good in human life. At the end of our exposition, we will be able to 
clarify more accurately this impossibility. Now, let us focus on the two explicit 
references to the Homeric poem that we find in the dialogue and, through them, 
let us try to better clarify this Socratic journey keeping always in mind its 
connection with the one Odysseus is also trying to fulfill. 
 
 
                                                          
13 Cf. Dixsaut (1999: xii); see also Ovid (Heroides 16, 71 ff., 149-152 and 5, 35 ff.). 
14 Dorothea Frede goes as far as to think that the main objective of the dialogue is what she 
calls the conversion of Protarchus (Frede 1993: lxv). 
15 See Philebus 19e1, 23b1-2, 50d2-10, 62b9. 
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ACHILLES' WRATH AND THE UNHIDDEN MIXTURES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN 
 
The first explicit references to be found in the dialogue is in Philebus 47e, in the 
long analysis of the nature of pleasure (cf. 31b-55c); and the second one in 
Philebus 62d, in the next to last section of the dialogue, where the final mixture 
between pleasure and reason is produced in the speech (cf. 59d-66d). Both 
references bring us to the Iliad, the first to book 18, where Achilles expresses his 
wrath when he knows that his friend Patroclus has died at the hands of Hector 
(Iliad, 18, 108-109); the second one to book 4, where a description of a dreadful 
battle between the Greeks and the Trojans is given (Iliad, 4, 450-56). 
The first reference is found in the longest section of the dialogue, where 
the nature of pleasure is analyzed and where the intention is also –as we have 
said before- to find the purest kinds of pleasure that are going to be allowed in 
the final mixture of which the best human life consists. Before commenting on 
the reference let us offer a short review of this long section of the dialogue, 
where Socrates will defend the thesis that –according to what has been 
explained in the cosmological part of the dialogue- “pleasure in itself is 
unlimited [ἀπείρων] and of the genus in and of itself that does not have and 
never will have a beginning, middle, or end” (Philebus, 31a6-9). The unlimited 
nature of pleasure (apart from being something connected to its cosmological 
origin as ἀπείρων) has to do with its interrelation with pain in human 
experience. This is so because in the experience of pleasure there is always a 
restoration of a state of harmony (identified with a state or process of 
fulfillment) bound with a destruction of this harmony (identified with a state or 
process of lack or emptiness where we feel pain). This process of destruction 
and restoration can be found in the body alone but it reveals its complexity 
when we observe it in the soul and, mainly, through the experience of 
expectation or anticipation (προσδόκημα; 32c5 and ff.). Socrates will carefully 
clarify the experience of expectation through a description of perception 
(αἴσθησις), memory (μνήμη) and desire (ἐπιθυμία): pleasure and pain are 
always bound together because we desire always the opposite of our present 
state, because “every living creature always strives towards the opposite of its 
own experience” (Philebus, 35c6-7; cf. 31c-36c). This description of the way 
anticipatory pleasure operates in us (which serves at the same time as a 
description of an essential element to comprehend human nature and 
experience) will be relevant to understand the Homeric representation of 
Achillesʹ wrath, where there is an actual feeling of pain mixed with a pleasant 
expectation of revenge. 
These kinds of pleasure are considered by Socrates as false, not only 
because of their unlimited nature (their connection with pain make them 
confusing and difficult to determine), but also because of the presence of a 
judgment in any circumstance where we feel, or imagine that we feel, pleasure 
or pain; a judgment that can be true or false, just or unjust (cf. 36c-46b). To 
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exemplify this fact he mentions seven emotions: wrath (ὀργὴν), fear (φόβος), 
longing (πόθος), lamentation (θρῆνος), love (ἔρωτα), jealousy (ζῆλος) and 
malevolence (φθόνος),16 and then proceeds by explaining two of them. In the 
first case using the Homeric reference to Achilles wrath; and in the second case 
an example taken from comedy, where an implicit reference to Aristophanes is 
made. In experiencing wrath or anger against our enemies (as it happens in the 
case of tragedies) or in laughing at the misfortunes of our friends (as it happens 
in the case of comedy), the pain or the pleasure felt (or the mixture between 
them) is not neutral, but implies, as we just mentioned, a true or false 
judgement. It is relevant to notice that the reference to the Homeric’ poem is not 
explained by Socrates, mainly because Protarchus seems to understand it 
without problems.17 The image has nevertheless a density that Protarchus fails 
to notice and that we will develop in the following lines. On the other side, 
Protarchus will have many difficulties in understanding the example of 
comedy, where in laughing we feel a clear pleasure apparently devoid of pain. 
That is why Socrates will devote a quite long argument to clarify this hidden 
experience felt in comedies (cf. Philebus, 47d-50e).18 In any case, it is worth 
                                                          
16 To understand all these mixtures it is relevant to see that in the Philebus, human soul is not 
described as a tripartite structure like in other Platonic dialogues, but through the fact that 
every emotion contains a portion of its opposite: each desire is a mixture of pleasure and pain 
because desire always implies the opposite of the present state. And this principle applies to all 
our emotions, both positive (like ἔρως) or negative (like φόβον or φθόνος) (34c-35d). Some of 
these emotions have been explained in different dialogues, like θρῆνος (Phaidon, 59a-b1) or 
ἔρως (Symposium, 206d3-e1; Phaedrus, 251c5-252). 
17 Some scholars put forward that the reason Socrates is not explaining the experience of wrath 
in tragedies is because it has been already explained in other dialogues, like the Republic. In this 
dialogue, tragic poetry is described as a false μίμησις: “we shall say the imitative poet produces 
a bad regime in the soul of each private man by making phantoms that are very far removed 
from the truth and by gratifying the soulʹs foolish part, which doesnʹt distinguish big from little, 
but believes the same things are at one time big and at another little” (605b6-c3). In tragic poetry 
we praise as a good poet the man who most puts us in the state of being delighted because of 
the suffering of the hero; but when that happens to us, we find it shameful (605c10-d5). Various 
authors have used this reference from the Republic as a key element to understanding the 
argument of the Philebus concerning tragedy and comedy. However, we believe that in the case 
of the Philebus, the clarification on these issues is carried on from a different perspective, first of 
all because in the case of the Philebus no reference is made to the tripartition of the soul which is 
at the background of Socratesʹ argument in the Republic; and also because in the Philebus 
tragedy and comedy are not considered as sources of confusion or error, but as a way to offer a 
diagnosis of the different reactions internal to our soul that are found in them (Frede 1993: xlv-
lviii). 
18 Protarchus is apparently able to see the hidden pleasures behind the pains of tragedy, but 
will be unable to see the pains behind the pleasures of comedy. Indeed, when Socrates gives the 
example of comedies Protarchus fails to see the painful element, and, without a painful element, 
there is no mixture in comedies, but a rather simple and neutral pleasurable experience. “Since 
it is such an obscure matter –says Socrates to Protarchus- let us be all the more careful. For this 
will help us to recognize more easily when there is a mixture of pain and pleasure in other cases 
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noticing that the falsehood of pleasures and pains in the tragic or the comic 
scene reveals not only the nature of pleasure but also its relevance to 
understanding human life in all its complexity, what Socrates calls “the entire 
tragedy and comedy of life” (50b2).19 In addition, this is so because, as we have 
said before, these experiences show that “every living creature always strives 
towards the opposite of its own experience” (Philebus, 35c6-7).  
Let us now focus on the first example, the one where the Homeric quote 
appears. The description of the emotion of wrath or anger is made using a 
version from a fragment of the Iliad, where Achilles describes this emotion by 
saying “…that can embitter even the wise… but much sweeter than soft-
glowing honey…”. This experience, adds Socrates, is to be found in 
lamentations and longings and in the “tragic spectacle, when people weep at 
                                                                                                                                                                          
as well” (Philebus, 48b4-8). It is obvious that comic situations and comical scenes are 
pleasurable, because we laugh at a situation or a person that we find to be ridiculous and this 
laughing is something obviously pleasant. The difficulty of Socrates’ example is to see which 
the painful element is; and his answer is to be found in the concept of φθόνος. The commentary 
of the example of comedy would bring us to talk about another equivalence also very relevant 
and maybe clearer, the one between the dialogue and the comedy of Aristophanes. That would 
be, nevertheless, the subject of another paper. Let’s just say that the reason Socrates is presented 
as ridiculous in the Clouds, as a physician or cosmologist, is the same that makes him feel 
ridiculous in the scene of the Philebus, when he is dividing the reality into parts or kinds (cf. 
Philebus, 23d1-5). The unjust and hidden mixture of pleasure and pain to be found in comedies 
represents a critique of the Aristophanic way of treating Socrates, of dealing with his wisdom 
and ignorance and with his ridiculousness. Our main concern here is, nevertheless, the example 
of tragedy, the one that Protarchus seems to understand without difficulty because in it the 
mixture seems to be unhidden. 
19 Moreover, it’s worth saying that the Socratic examples of tragedy and comedy focus the 
attention of the reader on the social or political dimension of human life. This is important at 
least for two different reasons in the context of this dialogue. The first one is that Plato’s 
Philebus, despite dealing in some sense with a socially relevant discussions on pleasure and 
human happiness, does it without the arguments and the strategies of the political philosophy 
that we know from other dialogues. Benardete may be right (although in a quite hyperbolic 
manner) when he affirms that “Socrates, then has been put by Plato in the difficult position of 
arguing against pleasure without any of the weapons with which his discovery of political 
philosophy might have furnished him” (Benardete 1993: 90). The indirect political significance 
of the dialogue is nevertheless clear concerning the relevance of education (the education of the 
pleasure and the education of youth) and concerning the different discussions presented in the 
dialogue. Dorothea Frede affirms that one feature of the dialogue is the return of a more 
“democratic Socrates”, a Socrates who is ready to design a best form of life that is acceptable to 
ordinary people (Frede 2010: 5). Francisco Lisi, in a similar sense, defences the centrality of the 
law in the argument of the dialogue (Lisi 2010: 178-187). See also Voegelin (2000). Secondly, the 
analysis of the mixture between pleasure and pain in the soul alone is, paradoxically, the one 
that brings us closer to an understanding of the political dimension of human life, a dimension 
where words like justice and injustice, false or true wisdom, friendship and enmity are relevant. 
Indeed, through this argument, Plato is showing us again the intimate connection between the 
human soul and the soul of the city; that which is written large in comedy and tragedy is 
written small in our souls, in the tragedy and comedy of our life (cf. Plato’s Republic, 368d). 
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the same time as they are rejoicing” (Philebus, 47e-48a). Notice that Socrates is 
not only describing the blending together of pleasure and pain from the point of 
view of the hero, but also from the point of view of the spectator of the tragedy, 
who is rejoicing and lamenting at the same time. Although we are not told 
which is the reason for our rejoicing as spectators, we can imagine that our 
pleasure comes from the fact that we are sure that we are not going to suffer the 
pain that we see in the scene (of course, the pain seems to be produced by the 
experience of seeing others suffering).20 Nevertheless, as we have said, Socratesʹ 
image refers mainly to the experience of the hero, who is in quite a different 
situation to that of the spectator: Achilles lamenting is again clear (he feels pain 
because of the death of his friend), but the reason for his pleasure remains 
hidden and unclear. Some clarification may be found, as we have said, in the 
description of the experience of expectation or anticipation, the first kind of 
false pleasure described (Philebus, 39d-41b). In the face of an experience of a lack 
(felt as a pain) we desire the opposite of our present state and, in doing so, we 
can feel a pleasure in our expectation, a pleasure that can be true or false (just or 
unjust). In this sense, the pleasure derived from the expectation of Achilles 
could be a pleasure produced by an image of the horror of death and revenge, a 
pleasure produced by the expectation of his glorifying revenge, a pleasure that 
Protarchus seems to recognize immediately. The Socratic argument seems to 
indicate that Achilles judgement (the judgement implied in his experience 
where pleasure and pain are mixed together) is a false one, producing in this 
sense a false pleasure. 
It is interesting to notice that when Socrates explains the way in which we 
can distinguish between true and false pleasures of expectation he states that 
pious and good men have true expectations, whereas bad and impious men 
have false expectations:  
 
[A]re we to say, then, that the paintings21, for those who are good, are set before them for 
the most part as true, because they are dear to the gods, but for the bad in turn it’s very 
much the contrary? […] The wicked, then, rejoice in false pleasures, but the good among 
human beings rejoice in true (Philebus, 40b1-c1).  
 
                                                          
20 This seems to be confirmed by Aristotle’ remark in his Rhetoric, where, using the same 
Homeric quote that Plato is using, he defines ὀργὴ “as a longing, accompanied by pain, for a 
real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight, affecting a man himself or one of his 
friends, when such a slight is undeserved […] and because this individual has done, or was on 
the point of doing, something against him or one of his friends; and lastly, anger is always 
accompanied by a certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to come” (Aristotle, Rethoric, II 1, 
1378 a 31-33). 
21 By ‘paintings’ (τὰ γεγραμμένα) Socrates means here the images that we have in our 
expectations, the image of myself being happy in the future would be a good example of these 
paintings or images.  
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This argument comes now into play with the pleasures felt by Achilles. 
The Homeric hero is in fact loved by some gods and hated by others and his 
pleasures are not precisely true or good, but rather bad and false.22 The fact that 
Protarchus is not aware of this fact proves that he does not fully understand the 
example of tragedy.  
To further grasp the relevance of the Socratic example, let us now turn our 
attention to its source in book 18 of the Iliad, at the moment where Achilles 
realizes that his beloved friend and comrade Patroclus died at the hands of 
Hector. Achilles is lamenting and raging over his failure to protect his friend 
and wishes to return to the battlefield with the sole aim of avenging him, even 
though the gods had warned that it would cost him his life. Now, if we observe 
the immediate context of the quote from the Iliad some interesting elements will 
arise:  
 
I wish that strife [ερις] would vanish away from among gods and mortals, and gall 
[χόλος], 23 which makes a man grow angry for all his great mind [πολύφρονα], that gall of 
anger that swarms like smoke inside of a man’s heart and becomes a thing sweeter to him by far 
than the dripping of honey. So it was here that the lord of men Agamemnon angered me. 
Still, we will let all this be a thing of the past, and for all our sorrow beat down by force 
the anger deeply within us. Now I shall go, to overtake that killer of a dear life, Hector; 
then I will accept my own death, at whatever time Zeus wishes to bring it about, and the 
other immortals […] Now I must win excellent glory, and drive some one of the women 
of Troy, or some deep-girdled Dardanian woman, lifting up to her soft cheeks both hands 
to wipe away the close burst of tears in her lamentation, and learn that I stayed too long 
out of the fight.24 
 
Many elements are remarkable in the Platonic use of the Homeric image.25 
It shows, on the one hand, that Plato finds in the poetic expression of emotions 
                                                          
22 As Benardete correctly states, “Achilles speech as a whole makes clear that the pleasure of 
anger consists in the vividness with which one depicts in advance the punishment one is certain 
will be inflicted on the wrongdoer. Socrates account of the difference between the just and the 
pious man and the wicked would have to be revised on the basis of what he implies” 
(Benardete 1993: 200). 
23 Note that the quotation used by Socrates is a slightly modified version of the original text, 
where Homer uses χόλος and not ὀργαῖς. 
24 Iliad, 18, 105-120. We are using throughout the paper Richard Lattimore translation, both of 
the Iliad and the Odyssey (Lattimore 1975; 1977). For the Greek source of the Iliad we are using 
the Oxford edition of 1920, and for the Odyssey the Cambridge-London edition of 1919, both 
available in the Perseus Digital Library. Italics are marking the correspondence with the Platonic 
quote, which has been, as we can see, shortened and slightly modified. 
25 One that we won’t be able to develop in our text is a hidden peculiarity of the example of 
tragedy (a peculiarity which is explicit in the case of comedy), which is the relevance of 
friendship in it. The fact that without the presence of an offense made to a friend, wrath or 
anger wouldn’t have taken place (in this case the one between Achilles and Patroclus). It is 
worth mentioning that the Homeric quote makes a clear distinction between Achillesʹ wrath 
against Agamemnon, where no friendship seems to be implied, and his wrath against Hector, 
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used by Homer something useful for his argument and, on the other hand, it 
tells us something about different ways of understanding human nature, its 
emotions and its relation with the gods. The Socratic or Platonic way of 
explaining or showing human emotions becomes different here -although not 
radically different- from the one used by Homer. This is so because in the 
Homeric scene there seem to be no end or limit to the godly and the human will 
for revenge or hate,26 whereas the Platonic dialogue tries to show precisely the 
unlimited nature of human emotions, an unlimited nature that must be taken 
into account in the representation of the best possible life, a life constituted by 
pleasure and reason in its due measure. Plato, throughout the construction of 
the dialogue and the analysis of human nature shows us new possibilities of 
relating within the community and with the gods, rethinking and relocating the 
complexity of human emotions. 27 
It is worth noticing that both Achilles and Socrates seem to be willing to 
finish the disputes between men and god, but Plato’s quotation in the dialogue 
–by omitting the presence of ἔρις- doesn’t reveal these elements for some 
                                                                                                                                                                          
where it is precisely his friendship with Patroclus that explains his reaction, his wrath and his 
desire to return to war. It is because of his friendship with Patroclus that Achilles is feeling and 
expressing the wrath against Hector that Socrates has chosen as an example of the hidden 
mixture of pleasure and pain in the soul alone. To confirm this connection between the scene 
and friendship we can turn again to Aristotle’s Rhetoric where we find exactly the same 
Homeric quote, in the moment where ὀργὴ is defined “as a longing, accompanied by pain, for a 
real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight, affecting a man himself or one of his 
friends, when such a slight is undeserved” (Aristotle, Rethoric, II 1, 1378 a 31-32). See also 
Aristotle Topoi (IV 5, 125 b 32-34). 
26 “si tel est le cas, on pourrait alors affirmer que Platon s’oppose, sur ce point précis, au 
discurs de la tragédie qui pose, en effet, que seule la douleur pure impose le silence à l’envie 
(dans l’Agamemnon d’Eschuyle, on lit au vers 904 que l’envie se tait devant la souffrance) et 
que c’est par la douleur absolute que cesse la vengeance interminable” (Wersinger 2010: 335). 
27 There is another element that can enrich even more these equivalences, namely the 
reference to the great mind or the moderate man: “gall, which makes a man grow angry for all his 
great mind [πολύφρονα]”; Achilles is describing the feeling of gall or wrath (a mixing of 
pleasure and pain that becomes mortal and tragic in the Homeric poem) of a very moderate 
man. Again, Protarchus doesn’t seem to notice the presence of this important element, but the 
word ‘πολύφρονα’ finds a place in Plato’s Philebus, at the beginning of the dialogue, when 
Socrates mentions different pleasures felt by different kinds of men, like in the intemperate (τὸν 
ἀκολασταίνοντα) and the moderate (τὸν σωφρονοῦντα) (cf. Philebus, 12c9-d4). At that 
moment, Protarchus accepts that these pleasures arise in different circumstances, but that in 
themselves they are not contrary to one another but identical to each other. Making Protarchus 
understand the difference between the pleasures of the moderate and the immoderate man 
(showing the complexity of pleasure as a unity) will be one of the main objectives of the 
dialogue as a whole and that makes the presence of the moderate man an important element in 
the Platonic dialogue. Again, the Socratic or Platonic model of a moderate men is clearly 
connected with the Homeric image but they are also different and this difference is similar to 
the one found between Achillesʹ way of confronting difficulties and situations of conflict and 
the Socratic way of doing it. 
68  BERNAT TORRES 
ANU.FILOL.ANTIQ.MEDIAEVALIA, 6/2016, pp. 55-77, ISSN: 2014-1386 
reason. Indeed, immediately before the Socratic quote, in the text of the Iliad 
Achilles mentions his will to finish the disputes (ἔρις) between men provoked 
by the gods: “I wish that strife would vanish away from among gods and 
mortals”. Eristic, as we have said, is an important concept in Plato’s Philebus, a 
concept opposed to dialectics as the proper way to search for the truth (Philebus, 
17a2-4). In the context of the dialogue, eristics seems to represent precisely the 
way Protarchus is confronting the questions, a way that is represented by an 
understanding of pleasure as a godly reality (remember the presence of 
Aphrodite in the dialogue). Dialectics, on the contrary, represents the proper 
way of confronting problems, a way that respects the real situation of the 
human condition. This opposition, nevertheless, will disappear in the 
confrontation that the dialogue shows and, in this sense, the distance between 
the poet and the philosopher does not seem to be so big. This fact, the failure to 
locate dialectics as the purest possible wisdom, could explain the reason why 
Plato is not mentioning eristics in his Homeric quotation. Be that as it may, it 
seems relevant to notice that in the Platonic dialogue ἔρις destroys or makes 
impossible the conversation, whereas dialectics, presented in the dialogue as a 
gift from the gods to men, make it possible, as Socrates shows by trying 
courageously and tirelessly, together with others, to search for the truest (cf. 
Philebus, 16c1-17a4). As we have said at the beginning, Socrates (or Plato 
through him) relocates and rethinks the relation between god and men. We will 
return to this aspect in the following lines.  
 
 
THE CONFLUENCE OF GLENS AND SOCRATES AS DOORKEEPER 
 
Let us focus now on the second direct reference present in the dialogue, the one 
that recalls a bloody battle between Greeks and Trojans as it is described in 
book 4 of the Iliad. In the Platonic dialogue the reference is located in the next to 
last section of the dialogue, where –after the long analysis of pleasure that 
occupies the most part of the dialogue and the short analysis of reason that 
follows it- the final mixture between both elements is effectively produced in 
the speech (Philebus, 59d-66d). This mixture represents the best possible life that 
the dialogue aims to describe from its beginning and this representation is 
connected with the image of the dwelling place of the good. The production of 
the mixture, done after a prayer to Dionysus and Hephaestus,28 is compared to 
                                                          
28 Dionysus is the god of wine and Hephaestus the god of fire and the forge, therefore, also of 
technique. The former may represent pleasure, while the latter may represent thought and 
technique (Klein 1972: 180). Moreover, it is interesting to note that both divinities produce or 
represent different kinds of mixtures: Dionysus the mixtures concerning wine; and Hephaestus 
the mixtures necessary for the forge (Robin 1935: 361). The result of each of the mixtures has 
clearly different objectives: the Dionysian ones are aimed to be used in celebrations or 
symposia; and in the case of Hephaestus the mixtures are used as tools for construction and also 
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a mixture made by a wine pourer who must find the right combination and 
measure between a spring of honey (representing here pleasure) and a spring of 
water (representing reason or thought) (cf. Philebus, 61b7-c8). This kind of life, 
understood as a mixture of reason, moderate pleasures and the truth, bring 
Socrates to stand “at the portico [πρόθυρον] of the dwelling of the good” 
(Philebus, 64c1-2). Socractes, as a new Odyssyeus, will be standing at the portico 
of his desired house without being able to stay there permanently. 
Keeping this image of the house in mind, let us see where the direct 
reference to Homer is to be found. Socrates will be here the wine pourer and 
will need to decide, and agree with Protarchus, which elements of each spring 
(the spring or reason and the spring of pleasure) will be accepted in the final 
mixture. As for the spring of reason, all kinds of sciences are going to be 
accepted and they will blend without distinction. And this will be so despite of 
the fact that the section of the dialogue devoted to examine reason and its 
different kinds established a more or less clear hierarchy of the sciences, from 
music, medicine or military strategy as more stochastic or less exact sciences to 
the more exact and pure ones, like mathematics and, above all, dialectics, the 
science that has access to things “that neither come to be nor perish, but are 
always in the same way and the same state” (Philebus, 61e2-3).29 The description 
of this situation is made through the Homeric image of the confluence of glens, 
an image that needs to be put together with the image of Socrates as a 
doorkeeper overwhelmed by the crown:  
 
Do you want me –he asks Protarchus when he realizes that the blending together seems 
inevitable- just as if I were a doorkeeper [θυρωρός] who was being pushed and shoved 
by the crowd, to open up the doors and, in my utter defeat [ἡσσάομαι], let all the 
sciences flood in and allow the more deficient to mix with the pure. (Philebus, 62c3-9)  
 
Protarchus adds here that once we have the purest sciences in the mixture, 
the impure ones cannot harm or affect the composition of the mixture. Exactly 
after this answer is when Socrates recalls the Homeric image of the confluence 
of glens: “So I am to let them all flood in into the receptacle of Homers’ very 
poetic ‘confluence of glens’” [μισγαγκείας] (Philebus, 62d4-6; Iliad, 4, 454). The 
violence of both images is clear but it seems fully irrelevant to Protarchus, who 
accepts this fact without hesitation. After that, Socrates turns immediately to the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
for battle. In fact in the above-mentioned book 18, Homer describes the way Hephaestus forges 
Achilles’ shield and armour, which will serve for his revenge with Hector (Iliad, 18, 465-615). 
29 The sciences (specifically the productive sciences) have been classified in 55d-57e. The 
classification is similar –although not identical- to the one we find in book VI of the Republic 
(see, for instance, 509d-511e). See for an analysis of the passage in the Philebus Benitez (1999). 
Protarchus will show himself reluctant to accept that there is a science superior to the art of 
persuasion that he learned from Gorgias, nevertheless, he concedes that dialectic is the truest of 
all sciences or arts. Protarchusʹ reluctance explains part of the tension of the argument. 
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analysis of pleasures30 and the Homeric reference and its meaning in the action 
of the dialogue are left behind without any further explanation. As it happened 
before with the Homeric quote that reveals the hidden mixture between pain 
and pleasure experienced in tragedies, now Protarchus seems to be again 
unaware of the consequences and the density of the Platonic use of the Homeric 
image.  
Before going on, let us remind ourselves briefly -as we did with the other 
reference- of the Homeric scene and its context. As we have said, the quote is 
from book 4 of the Iliad, which begins with a council of the gods and describes 
precisely a situation of war, the clash of Greeks and Trojans who are killing and 
being killed. In the council organized by Zeus, the goddess of youth and 
cupbearer for the gods Hebe is present, “pouring them nectar as wine”.31 The 
council is celebrated because the war has taken an unexpected twist: in the duel 
for Helen, Menelaus has beaten Paris, but before he could kill him and claim 
victory, Aphrodite spirited Paris away inside the walls of Troy, bringing him 
back with Helena. Zeus, to avoid the end of the war and the victory of the 
Achaeans sends Athena, who orders a Trojan soldier to injury Menelaus and, in 
doing so, the Trojans break the oath that was taken. This fact will produce the 
wrath of the Achaeans and especially of Agamemnon: “So, the Trojans have 
stuck you [Menelaus] down and trampled on the oath sworn. Still the oath and 
the blood of the lambs shall not be called vain, the unmixed wine poured and 
the right hands we trusted” (Iliad, 4, 157-160). So despite the agreements and the 
good words, the oath between the Achaeans and the Trojans has been broken, 
but Agamemnon believes that the gods will repair this deception somehow, 
because “Zeus the father shall not be one to give aid to liars” (Iliad, 4, 235).32 
                                                          
30 In the case of the spring of pleasure only the most pure ones are going to be allowed in the 
mixture, because as the dialogue has shown, mixed pleasures (like the ones that are to be 
experienced in the Homeric tragedies and also in comedies) are often false and unjust and 
produce in us false expectations, hopes and representations of our own existence; due to their 
unlimited nature, pleasures cannot enter without distinction in the best mixture, they cannot be 
part of the best possible life. 
31 It is worth mentioning that Hebe is in Plato’s Philebus a relevant and unmentioned divinity 
represented, indirectly, by Philebus, who’s name means “the lover of the youth” or, if you wish, 
“the lover of Hebe”. Hebe was the cupbearer for the gods of Mount Olympus, serving their 
nectar and ambrosia; in the dialogue the one who acts as cupbearer is Socrates (cf. Philebus, 
61c3). Plato is, as usually, rethinking ina very creative way important elements of the tradition.  
32 When Agamemnon sees his injured brother Menelaus, he sends the “blameless physician” 
Machaon, son of Asklepios. Machaon will be wounded himself and treated by giving him a cup 
of hot wine sprinkled with grated goat cheese and barley (Iliad, 11, 638). The presence of a 
physician could have nothing to do with the presence of medicine as a stochastic science in the 
Philebus but the coincidence is nevertheless worth mentioning. Also military strategy is present 
immediately after, when Agamemnon inspects the troops before the battle, “he regarded 
through the ranks of his men and set them in order” (Iliad, 4, 250). 
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When the troops finally meet in the field, Homer describes the scene and the 
mentioned quote becomes known:  
 
Now as these advancing came to one place and encountered, they dashed their shields 
together and their spears, and the strength of armored men in bronze, and the shields 
massive in the middle clashed against each other, and the sound grew huge of the 
fighting. There the screaming and the shouts of triumph rose up together of men killing 
and men killed, and the grounds ran blood. As when rivers in winter spate running 
down from the mountains throw together at the meeting of streams [μισγάγκειαν] the 
weight of the water out of the great springs behind in the hollow stream-bed, and far 
away in the mountains the shepherd hears their thunder; such, from the coming together 
of men, was the shock and the shouting33 
 
The density of the Homeric image is, again, overwhelming. The first 
elements that seems to be worth mentioning is the violence of the situation 
described: the image seems to imply that as it happens in the battlefield (where 
both sides are killing and being killed), the blending together of all sciences 
represents its mutual annihilation or, if you wish, it represents the chaos and 
the disorder. This chaos and disorder are to be found in human life, the place 
where the mixture takes place. However, in which sense is this chaos to be 
understood? As the dialogue between Socrates and Protarchus shows, blending 
all kinds of knowledge means that the divine knowledge about figure, justice or 
dialectics cannot be detached from human knowledge of figures, justice and 
dialectics. In a similar way, music (a mimetic and stochastic knowledge far less 
exact and less precise than arithmetic or dialectics) must be accepted in the 
mixture provided that without it -Protarchus states- “our life will ever be in any 
way whatsoever a life” (Philebus, 62c3-4). This blending together is, from the 
point of view of Protarchus, a condition for Socrates to go back home; they must 
mix them all, he says, “if in fact any of us is going to find at any time the way 
home” (Philebus, 62b8-9). Protarchus is here repeating in a subtle way the threat 
to Socrates that we mentioned before. We as readers could somehow agree with 
Protarchusʹ point of view, because there is no happiness without the concrete 
and human dimension represented here by music or human justice. If we 
translate this idea into the image of the Platonic Republic, there is no way out of 
the cave without the way into the cave; the image of the way home and the 
image of life with which Protarchus reminds the reader seem to be images of 
the interior of the cave, 34 but they are as well threats to Socrates. The image of 
the blending together of all kinds of sciences makes us stay in the interior of the 
cave and this situation is described by the Platonic art of writing as violent and 
tragic. 
                                                          
33 Iliad, 4, 446-456. The italics are marking the Platonic reference. 
34 An interior of the cave where, as Benardete says, “perhaps Protarchus believes Gorgianic 
rhetoric would exercise its power and supplement the knowledge of beings” (Benardete 1993: 
231). 
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However, is this violent situation due to the mingling together of the 
sciences or due to the threats that compel Socrates to produce this mingling? 
Maybe a combination of both elements? We cannot know it with certainty, but 
it seems clear that Socrates wants to show to Protarchus and to the reader the 
dangers of mixing all kinds of sciences in the final mixture of which the best 
possible life consists. This has a somehow metaphorical correspondence with 
the Homeric scene, where we clearly see that the state of war is reached due to 
different betrayals, due to the fact that both gods and humans are constantly 
lying to each other and this is so because both gods and humans are constantly 
subject to emotions that are inconspicuously mixed and that produce 
contradictory actions. It is true, in the dialogue dialectic clearly wins because it 
is presented as the most pure and exact of all sciences (scf. Philebus, 57e-59d), 
but this is only an apparent victory which is contradicted by the action of the 
dialogue itself, particularly by Protarchus responses and by the unexpressed 
content of the conversation. And again, also in the Homeric scene an apparent 
victory is to be found, a victory that is and is not a victory because Aphrodite 
appears at the last second and saves Paris, the apparently lover of Helena. The 
gods and the men of the Homeric scene are the opposite of pure and exact 
reason, they may even represent the irrationality or the annihilation of reason 
and this situation is not far away from the one we find in the Platonic dialogue. 
In both cases, Aphrodite seems to be at the origin of the confrontation, in the 
dialogue through its identification with the limitlessness of pleasure, in the 
Homeric poem through the betrayal of the oaths established between men and 
gods. 
All in all, Socrates must accept that the world is an irrational and an 
inexact one, a chaotic world where exact sciences like dialectics must live 
together with the inexact ones and, in this sense with rhetoric or sophistry, with 
the dangers that this fact implies for the dialogue and also for life in the city 
(and for the life of Socrates himself).35 Both in the poem and in the dialogue it 
seem impossible to live a life of purity, in the first case because of godly and the 
human disloyalty; in the second one because knowledge of the concrete cannot 
be detached from knowledge of the general, or because Protarchus is not 
willing to accept the victory of dialectics over less exact sciences, like music or, 
if you wish, persuasion or rhetoric.  
The image of a life deprived of order implies the disorder in the soul and 
in the city, and this same image of chaos is the one reproduced by Socrates 
through the image of the doorkeeper overwhelmed by the crowd, a crowd that 
                                                          
35 We must always keep in mind the destiny of the historical Socrates, who was condemned 
by the city of Athens for corrupting the youth and inventing new gods. His first accusation 
being based on an identification between Philosophy and Sophistry or rhetoric. In this sense, 
Protarchus need of mixing together dialectics or Philosophy and rhetoric has a tragic reading, 
because it leaves Socrates without any possible defence in front of his accusation. 
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could very well represent the opinion of the masses, of the people who, like 
Protarchus, donʹt care much about order in sciences, but rather for the 
immediate pleasure, an immediate pleasure like the one you get from rhetoric 
or music. Protarchus sees no harm in this chaos, possibly because he lives in it, 
he lives a life of pleasure, a life in the limitlessness of pleasures that do not let 
him understand the dangers of wrongly understanding the relevance of reason 
for life. Protarchus is happy to know that music will be included in the final 
mixture, because he enjoys music as he enjoys the Socratic speeches or the 
discourses of Gorgias. As we have said, the image of chaos and war fades out 
immediately in the dramatic action of the dialogue maybe because, as 
Benardete states, “war as the central fact of political life has been disguised 
through the poet”.36 
In the Homeric imaginary, another element can wake our interest 
concerning the relevance of the disorder and the confrontation, an element that 
the Platonic dialogue is omitting for a second time: the presence of Eris, the 
goddess of chaos, strife and disorder. In the Homeric poem, Eris serves in this 
occasion to describe the situation of war between the two armies: the Achaeans 
are depicted as a unified group which “went silently, you would not think all 
these people with voices kept in their chests were marching; silently, in fear of 
their commanders” (Iliad, 4, 428-432); whereas the Trojans are presented as a 
dispersed group of men, talking different languages, “since there was no speech 
nor language common to all of them but their talk was mixed”.37 The Achaeans 
were driven by Ares and Athena, whereas “Terror drove them [the Trojans], 
and Fear, and Hate [Ἔρις] whose wrath is relentless”.38 In the scene of the Iliad, 
Hate (Ἔρις) is told to be a little thing in the first instance, but after “grows until 
she strides on the earth with her head striking heaven” (Iliad, 4, 445). This 
divinity seems to be responsible for the bitterness and produces more pain in 
both sides. In Plato’s Philebus, eristic is not considered a divinity anymore; 
whereas dialectics -not being a divinity either- is described, as we have said, as 
a gift from the gods to men, a gift that is at the origin of any art or technique 
and also as an image of the proper way to engage in a dialogue. In Plato’s 
Philebus eristic is described as the opposite of dialectics, it means a discourse 
where the aim is not the truth but the defense of one’s own position and the 
                                                          
36 Benardete (1993: 233). 
37 If we observe the Homeric description of the opponents, which in the Platonic dialogue are 
represented by the more pure and the less pure science, we can see a quite interesting 
equivalence. In the description of both armies, one is depicted as unified and silent and the 
other one as disunited and talking different languages. In the dialogue the two armies seem to 
correspond to the pure and impure sciences; pure sciences deal always with identical unities (as 
mathematics and dialectics show) and impure ones treat with more complex and dissimilar 
unities (as in military strategy, for instance). 
38 “Δεῖμός τ᾽ ἠδὲ Φόβος καὶ Ἔρις ἄμοτον μεμαυῖα” (Iliad, 4, 440). Note that Ἔρις” is 
translated by Lattimore as “Hate”.  
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love of victory (φιλονικια; Philebus, 17a1-5). Proper dialogue is possible if the 
interlocutors are not seen as rivals or enemies, but as friends working together 
to achieve a common goal. Achieving this goal is one of Socrates’ priorities in 
the dialogue with Protarchus, who during the conversation seems more 
interested in the victory of his discourse (or in the defeat of the Socratic one) 
than in the search for the truth. Again, the Platonic dialogue seems to offer us a 
way to end the eternal confrontations between men and between men and gods. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen just before, dialectics seem to be condemned to 
live together with other less exact sciences and, in this sense, this gift of the 
gods may be annihilated as the Homeric image of the “confluence of glens” 
suggests.  
Finally, and as a conclusion, let us return to the image of the Socratic 
journey, the way back home of the hero and the relevance of the choice of life 
that lies at the background of the dialogue. The Socratic journey in Plato’s 
Philebus is aiming at reaching the dwelling place of the good and the best 
possible life, a life understood as a mixture of reason, moderate pleasures and 
the truth. When Socrates finishes the description of this life, he stands, as a new 
Osysseus, “at the portico [πρόθυρον] of the dwelling of the good” (Philebus, 
64c1-2). This place is the same that Socrates mentions just before the image of 
the confluence of glens comes into play, where he compare himself with a 
“doorkeeper [θυρωρός] who was being pushed and shoved by the crowd” 
(Philebus, 62c5-6). Socrates, overwhelmed by the crowd, is obliged to let the less 
exact sciences entering into the mixture of the best possible life and, 
furthermore, he will not be able to access this, as he will not be able to return 
home.  
This fact, the Socratic impossibility of returning home, means from the 
perspective of the dialogue, the inaccessibility of the good itself and the 
necessary distance between human and transcendental order. In this sense we 
can find in the dialogue a revalorization of the sensible world in front of a pure 
transcendent and ideal word, the world on the outside of the cave39 and, at the 
same time, a clear statement that we, as human being, are unable to completely 
reach happiness. The impossibility of returning home has to do, at the same 
time, with the fact that Protarchus and the young people around him are 
constantly threatening Socrates saying that he cannot escape and return home 
before having reached a limit in the explanations (Philebus, 19d-e).40 At the very 
                                                          
39 This is the reading of Samuel Scolnicov, who affirms that the problem of the one and the 
many that is presented in the dialogue implies a treatment of many situation in the sensible 
world, in the human world of the impure sciences; this is, from his point of view, the sense of 
the third questions asked in Philebus 15b3-8. Cf. Scolnicov (2010: 333). 
40 A threat that will be repeated in 23b, when Protarchus affirms that due to Socrates argument 
(an argument where Philebus divinity is definitely dethroned) pleasure has fallen in her fight 
for victory: “you don’t realize –says Protarchus in an unfriendly manner to Socrates- that not 
one among us would let you go before you have carried the discussion of these questions to its 
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end of the dialogue, Protarchus, the youngster who never has enough of 
Socrates’ speeches, is not letting him go because he still has another question to 
ask (Philebus, 67b). This is how the dialogue finishes, leaving the reader with the 
indetermination and Socrates without his desired home. In asking him a new 
question, Protarchus shows his insatiable desire for speeches; his unlimited 
pleasure has not been removed by the dialogue with the wise Socrates. 
Protarchus choice is at the end a choice for the pleasures of speech, for an 
unlimited life with unlimited boundaries that seems to be, overall, a human life. 
This choice, as the choice of Paris for Aphrodite, seems to be at the very origin 
of the confrontation that the dialogue represents.  
All in all, Socrates seems to be presented in this sense as a new Odysseus 
on his way back home; both Odysseus and Socrates must take a long journey to 
go back home, facing difficulties and dangers, and once there, once they are 
almost at the dwelling of the desired end, they still need to fight and will not be 
able to access it. The Homeric hero also stands at the portico of his house before 
entering the palace in Troy, and he will be threatened by the pretenders exactly 
in this place: “Give way, old sir, from the forecourt [πρόθυρον], before you are 
taken and dragged out. Do you see how all of them are giving the signal and 
telling me to drag you” (Odyssey, 18, 10). Odysseus will be able to protect his 
house from their enemies, but will not be able to stay there or to enter into it. 
Odysseus will need to fight and win all of Penelope’s pretenders, whereas 
Socrates will need to engage in a dialogue in order to avoid letting the life of 
pleasure enter alone in the house of the good. Be it as it may, in both situations 
the desired goal is not achieved completely. Socrates and Odysseus share a 
somehow tragic destiny that in the case of Socrates is not based on a prophecy, 
but has a more philosophic meaning: the inaccessibility of the good itself and 
the necessary and due distance between human and transcendental or divine 
order. Socrates reminds nevertheless a hero, a new hero that is able to resist the 
threats of the young hedonists and try at the same time to orient them toward 
the proper way of life. He is not living this situation with despair like the 
Homeric Odysseus, but with a tragi-comical spirit imprinted by the Platonic art 
of writing. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
end” (Philebus, 23b1-4). Afterwards, having described the mixed pleasures and before analyzing 
the unmixed ones, Socrates states: “Now speak. Are you letting me go, or will you keep me up 
to midnight? But, I suspect, if I just make a small remark, I’ll succeed in winning from you my 
release” (Philebus, 50d6-8). See Klein (1972: 176). Other threads directed to Socrates from the 
young Protarchus can be read in 16a6, 19d8-e5, 20b3 and 62b7-9. 
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